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An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice Practitioners: Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and
Juror Responsibility
Lieutenant Colonel Eric R. Carpenter*
Introduction
What exactly happens in the deliberation room of a
capital trial? What are the jurors thinking and how are they
acting as they make their decisions? Do they act rationally
and bravely like the holdout juror played by Henry Fonda in
12 Angry Men,t or do they succumb to group pressure and
change their votes without actually changing their minds?
Do they understand and follow the military judge's
directions or are they confused about the fundamental rules
that govern capital cases? Do they accept responsibility for
their votes or shift responsibility to the other actors in the
system? In a capital system that requires a unanimous vote
at several stages 2-and where a holdout juror can stop the
death penalty process-it is critically important for capital
attorneys to know the answers to these questions.
Because juror deliberations are closed and secret,
however, trial advocates have not had much insight into
juror dynamics. 3 Fortunately, the Capital Jury Project (CJP),
a major research effort, has come up with some answers to
those questions, and many of these answers are startling.
Civilian capital defense counsel have recognized the value
of the CJP findings by adopting new strategies based on
those findings, particularly in theme development and voir
dire. Unfortunately, most military counsel are not familiar
with the CJP's findings or these new strategies and we, as a
community, risk falling well below the standard of practice
currently found in state and federal death penalty cases.
. Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Currently assigned as Professor and Chair, Criminal
Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School,
U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. The author would like to thank
Colonel Cynthia Rapp and Lieutenant Colonels Luis Rodriguez and Kerry
Erisman, with a special thanks to Majors Gregory Malson and Marc
Cipriano. This article is the first in a two-part series. See also Lieutenant Colonel
Eric R. Carpenter, An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice
Practitioners: Aggravation, Mitigation, and Admission Defenses, ARMY LAW.
(forthcoming July 2011).
1 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). The movie was based
on the teleplay and play by Reginald Rose, and was remade as a television
show in 1997.
2 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1004 (2008)
[hereinafter MCM].
At least two projects have filmed actual jury deliberations. Frontline
filmed a jury as it deliberated a case involving jury nullification, Frontline:
Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast Apr. 8, 1986) [hereinafter
Frontline project], and ABC News filmed five juries as they deliberated five
separate cases, including one capital case, In the Jury Room (ABC
television broadcast Aug. 10, 2004). The deliberations captured in these
videos reflect many of the Capital Jury Project findings. See also HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966) (the first in-
depth study of juror dynamics).
Military capital attorneys are drawn from a pool of
general criminal trial advocates. Most in this pool have no
experience in capital litigation4 because very few courts-
martial are referred with a capital instruction and military
attorneys frequently rotate through both locations and legal
disciplines. While serving as general criminal litigators,
these counsel have no pressing need to keep up with this
capital litigation developments. Therefore, military counsel
who find themselves detailed to a capital case will likely be
operating in the world of the Unknown Unknowns, as
Donald Rumsfeld would say. Review his famous quote,
cleverly adapted by Hart Seely (without changing the order
of any words) to a poem titled Unknown:
As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
When an attorney can spot the issue and know the answer
right away, she is operating in the world of the Known
Knowns. When she can spot the issue but still needs to look
up the answer, she is operating in the world of Known
Unknowns. When she has no idea what the issues are, she is
in the world of Unknown Unknowns: she does not even
know that she should be looking something up.7 With no
previous exposure to capital litigation-and not having-peers
or supervisors with that experience-a military defense
counsel assigned to a capital case may not know that she
does not know about admission defenses, the Colorado
method of voir dire, or the Federal Death Penalty Resource
Counsel.
4 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) has noted that "there
is no professional death penalty bar in the military services." United States
v. Kreutzer, 61 M.J. 293, 299 n.7 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
5 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 10-11 (2001), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/cox-comm-report2.pdf.rd=
I.
6 Hart Seely, The Poetry of D.H. Rumsfeld: Recent Works of the Secretary
ofDefense, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2003), http://www.slate.com/id/2081042/.
Recognizing that a defendant or accused, or an attorney, or a panel
member or juror are represented by both sexes in capital cases, throughout
this article, I will use "he" as the pronoun for the defendant or accused;
"she" as the pronoun for the attorney; and "he" as the pronoun for a juror or
panel member.
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The main purpose of this article is to shrink somewhat,
for the prospective military capital attorney, the world of the
capital Unknown Unknowns by providing an overview of
certain areas covered by the CJP-capital jury dynamics,
juror confusion, and juror responsibility-and by providing
an overview of a major litigation technique that has been
developed based on those CJP findings, the Colorado
method of voir dire. Having moved these topics to the
category of Known Unknowns, prospective military capital
attorneys can then work to learn these topics.
Yet military attorneys may not find value in the CJP
findings if they think that these findings are unique to
civilian jurors and would not shed light on how court-martial
panel members think and act. That leads to the other
purpose of this article: to show that some evidence exists
that capital court-martial panels behave consistently with the
CJP findings. Military panel members are human beings
and have shown that they follow the same patterns of
reasoning and behavior that civilian jurors follow. Not all
jurors or panel members will follow all of the patterns
revealed by the CJP, but many will think and act in ways
described by the CJP findings and some will cast votes
based on those thoughts-and in a system where a single
vote can decide life or death, those votes are critical.
This article will first cover the CJP findings on jury
dynamics; will look at how the military's rules that govern
capital cases could impact panel dynamics; and will
demonstrate that military panels in three capital courts-
martial have behaved consistently with the CJP findings.
This article will next cover the CJP findings related to juror
confusion and will demonstrate that military panels or
military judges in three capital courts-martial have behaved
consistently with those findings. Next, this article will
discuss the concept of juror responsibility and how this
concept may apply in a military context. Finally, this article
will discuss a method of voir dire that defense counsel can
use in capital cases to address the issues raised by the CJP.
What is the Capital Jury Project?
Started in 1991, the CJP is a research project supported
by the National Science Foundation and headquartered at the
University of Albany's School of Criminal Justice.' The
people doing the work are "a consortium of university-based
investigators-chiefly criminologists, social psychologists,
and law faculty members-utilizing common data-gathering
instruments and procedures."9
8 What is the Capital Jury Project?, STATE UNIV. OF NEW YORK AT
ALBANY SCH. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPwhat.
him (last visited June 7, 2011) [hereinafter What is the CJP?].
9 William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview ofEarly Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1068 (1995).
. The CJP investigators conducted in-depth interviews
with people who have served on juries in capital cases,
"randomly selected from a random sample of cases, half of
which resulted in a final verdict of death, and half of which
resulted in a final verdict of life imprisonment." 0 Trained
interviewers administered a fifty-one page survey and then
conducted a three to four hour interview." The interviews
"chronicle the jurors' experiences and decision-making over
the course of the trial, identify points at which various
influences come into play, and reveal the ways in which
jurors reach their final sentencing decisions."1 2  When
coming to their findings, the researchers draw upon the
statistical data created by the surveys and interviews as well
as the narrative accounts given by the jurors.'3 To date, the
CJP has conducted interviews with 1198 jurors from 353
capital trials in 14 states. 14 Academics have published the
results of these interviews in many journals and books.15
Findings on Juror Dynamics
In the 1950s, Solomon Asch ran a series of experiments
sponsored by the U.S. Navy that revealed the dynamic of
social conformity, which is essentially the fear of
disagreeing with the majority in a public setting. 6  The
examiner would bring a subject into a classroom along with
seven to nine other people, all of whom were in on the
experiment (only the subject was not).'7 As an example, the
examiner would give a card to the subject with a line on it,
'0 John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND
REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 144, 173 (Stephen P. Garvey ed.
2003).
" Id.
12 What is the CIP?, supra note 8.
" Id. See also Bowers, supra note 9, at 1077-84 (in-depth discussion of the
sample design and data collection methods); Blume et al., supra note 10, at
145-48.
14 What is the C/P?, supra note 8.
15 ScoTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY (2005) (providing an excellent introduction to and survey
of the CJP findings). Sundby introduces the broad themes of the CJP within
the study of a single jury. For lists of publications related to the CJP, see
Publications, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIM. JUST.,
http://www.albany.edulscj/CJPpubs.htm (last visited June 7, 2011); Articles,
CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-
penalty-project/Articles.cfm (last visited June 7, 2011); SUNDBY, supra,
app., at 213-15.
6 S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and
Distortion ofJudgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN: RESEARCH IN
HUMAN RELATIONS 177 (Harold Guetzkow ed. 1951) [hereinafter Asch,
Effects of Group Pressure]; SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1952) [hereinafter ASCH]; Solomon E. Asch, Studies ofIndependence and
Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956) [hereinafter Asch, A
Minority of One). See also GREGORY BURNS, ICONOCLAST: A
NEUROSCIENTIST REVEALS How To THINK DIFFERENTLY 88-92 (2008)
(providing simple explanations of these experiments); SUNDBY, supra note
15, at 81-84.
17 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 178.
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along with another card that had three lines on it, as shown
below:'1
1 2 3
The subject's task was to match the line on the left to either
line 1, 2, or 3 on the right. The examiner would then ask one
of the other people who was helping with the experiment for
the answer and the person would deliberately give an
incorrect answer, say, 1. The examiner would ask another
person and that person would also give that same incorrect
answer, and on down the line until the examiner reached the
subject. The examiner would then ask the subject for the
answer, which the subject would have to state in front of
everyone else. 9
The results of the experiment are startling: for each
individual question, the subjects would go along with the
group and give the wrong answer to this simple question
nearly one-third of the time. During the series of multiple
questions, one-fourth of the subjects would miss at least one
20question. Compare that to when the subjects were alone
when they did the task: the subjects would get the right
answer on all of the questions 95% of the time.21
The experiments revealed that this force of social
conformity primarily arose when three or more people gave
the wrong answer first; had some influence when two people
gave the wrong answer first; and had little influence when
only one gave the wrong answer first.22 Further, if just one
other person went against the majority, the power of the
group pressure was greatly reduced. If that "partner" later
changed his answer to the incorrect answer, the power of
social conformity returned with full force.23 When the
subjects did not have to announce their findings in public,
the majority effect diminished markedly. 24
' ASCH, supra note 16, at 452.
'9 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 178-79.
20 Id. at 181-82; Asch, A Minority of One, supra note 16, at 9.
21 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 181; ASCH, supra note
16, at 457; Asch, A Minority of One, supra note 16, at 9-10.
22 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 188.
23 Id. at 186.
24 Asch, A Minority of One, supra note 16, at 65.
But can one look to Asch's research to draw
conclusions about how jurors and panel members act? The
situations are quite different. First, other than public
embarrassment, not much was on the line during the Asch
experiments. Much more is at stake in a capital trial-
someone's life. Next, in Asch's experiments, the subjects
were dealing with facts (the length of lines). Capital jurors
deal with facts but they also deal with norms and values such
as whether someone should live or die. Finally, in the Asch
experiments, no requirement existed for the group to return a
unanimous group answer-the experiment dealt with a series
of individual answers. Capital juries must return a
unanimous verdict.
The CJP research shows that the answer to this question
is, "Yes." Capital jurors, dealing in norms or values, faced
with the requirement to produce a unanimous answer, are
affected by group pressure-even when someone's life is on
the line. But unlike the Asch findings, adding one partner
(having a minority of two) is not enough to overcome that
pressure. The minority needs to be at least 25% and
probably as high as 33% in order for those jurors to preserve
in their votes. For example, during the first vote on
sentence, if 25% or fewer of the jurors vote for life, those
jurors will almost always change their votes and the verdict
will be death. If 33% or more vote for life, those jurors will
almost always maintain their vote and the verdict will be
life. If the vote falls between 25% and 33%, the verdict can
go either way. 25
Importantly, the research indicates that the minority
voters do not actually change their beliefs about whether the
defendant should live or die: they just change their votes.26
Asch stated that, "A theory of social influences must take
into account the pressures upon persons to act contrary to
their beliefs and values."27 What social pressures and
dynamics occur in a deliberation room that can cause
someone to vote against his belief when so much is at stake?
One of the first interesting findings is that jurors do not
remain open-minded for very long. Even if jurors were not
that committed to their position before they cast their first
vote, they quickly harden them: "Psychologists have
discovered that when groups deliberate and an initial
disagreement exists, group members tend not to move
toward a 'middle' position, but actually become even more
25 Blume et al., supra note 10, at 173. See also Scott Sundby, War and
Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries Reach Unanimity, 62
HASTINGs L.J. 103, 110 (2010). Sundby notes that there is a first vote
threshold that forecasts the result of the trial in eighty-nine percent of the
studies he sampled. With a jury of twelve members, if the first vote has five
or more votes for life, the sentence will almost always be life. If the first
vote on sentence has nine or more votes for death, the sentence will almost
always be death.
26 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 96-97; Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital
Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for
Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1195-220 (1995).
27 ASCH, supra note 16, at 450-51.
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extreme or polarized in the direction of their original
leanings."2 8 As members of the majority argue their points
to the minority, the members of the majority become
cemented in their attitudes 29 and approach the minority as
teachers "trying to lead students to the right answer."30 The
middle ground quickly disappears. Scott Sundby also notes
that some juries learned from the guilt-phase voting that
once people make a public announcement of their position, it
is difficult to move them off that position.31 Based on those
guilt-phase experiences, some juries decided to avoid that
problem by not taking an initial vote during the penalty
phase, thereby trying to preserve some middle ground.32
With jurors now polarized, the majority begins to work
on the minority by applying social pressure. Sundby notes
that in many of the juries studied, some jurors adopted
recurring roles. One of these roles is the victim's advocate.
The victim's advocate believes that "it is up to them
personally to act as the victim's voice in the jury room"33
and "that 'they didn't want to run into the victim's parents
and feel like they didn't do the right thing by the victim and
parents."' 34 Another of these roles is the bully. The bully
may resort to sarcasm, belligerence, name calling, and
demeaning comments. The bully may believe that his role
is to serve as the "bad cop": "He sensed that the others
expected him to be brusque, to raise the arguments that they
were too polite to make or were not worldly enough to fully
comprehend."3 6 Sometimes these roles are played by the
same juror. Often, in civilian trials, the deliberations will
become contentious, loud, and angry,3 7 and jurors are often
reduced to tears.3 8
28 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 51. Asch describes something similar, where
the subject adopts the majority position and the act of adopting the majority
position "increases the person's confidence in his response." Asch, Effects
of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 182. Further, "[G]roup decisions are
generally more extreme than are individual decisions." Steven J. Sherman,
The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How Psychology
Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241, 1246 (1995). Sherman continues,
"[D]ifferent individuals may have different reasons for their individual
decision. When each person is then exposed to other supporting arguments
by the other group members who share their decision outcome, they become
even more polarized. Research clearly demonstrates that jury deliberations
produce this polarization effect." Id.
29 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 51-52.
30 Id. at 21.
3' Sundby, supra note 25, at 112.
32 id.
3 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 128.
34 Id. at 129.
3 Id. at 122.
36 Id.
" Id. at 123.
38 Id. at 56.
As the minority is whittled down to a single holdout,39
the pressure increases. Frustration and anger arise because
the majority feels that the holdout can essentially hold the
entire group's decision hostage to his views.40 Members of
the majority will challenge the holdout with whether he had
been honest in voir dire when asked if he could vote for
death (or life, if holding out the other way).41 Jurors will use
subtle pressure to get the holdout to change his position like
cutting off his questions, talking to him in a patronizing
tone, or sighing.42 According to Asch, this withdrawal of
social support is a powerful component of group pressure.43
Further, the holdout is under constant pressure from all
angles and cannot take any mental breaks:
The worst part was that [the holdout]
could not easily opt out of the active
deliberations as some other jurors had
done. [The holdout] had become the focus
of the deliberations, and in some sense
every question and every comment was
directed at her, asking her to justify how
she could still be voting life now that
eleven were for the death penalty.44
The members of the majority can take turns. They can
daydream or go to the bathroom while someone else takes
the lead. The holdout has no relief.
Eventually the holdout changes his vote, not because he
now believes in the rightness of the other side's position or
is persuaded by the aggravating evidence, but because he has
reached emotional exhaustion and simply acquiesces.
Sundby remarks,
[T]he powerful pull of conformity can be
observed readily, whether on the
playground or in the workplace. And, of
course, such pressures come into play in
the jury room. For those of us who have
whispered to ourselves that we would play
Henry Fonda's role in the jury room, the
sobering reality is that many of us would
not live up to our hopes and
expectations. 45
3 See also id. at 81-84 (including an interesting discussion of Asch's
experiments related to this process).
40 Id. at 55.
41 Id. at 23.
42 Id. at 66-68.
43 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure, supra note 16, at 188.
4 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 85.
45 Id. at 84.
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Likewise, the jurors who cross-over from a death vote to a
life vote often do so to avoid becoming a hung jury and not
because they were influenced by mitigating factors.46 As
Asch would predict, the social factors in the courtroom-
and not the aggravating or mitigating circumstances-drive
the juror to change his vote.47
Jury Dynamics and the Military Justice System-in
Theory
This section will discuss in theory how panel member
dynamics in a capital case might be affected by the force of
social conformity. The next section will discuss whether
there is any evidence that the dynamics discovered by the
CJP actually exist in capital courts-martial. Looking first at
voting procedures, like civilian capital trials, capital courts-
martial require unanimous votes: before a death sentence
may be imposed, a panel must have a unanimous finding of
guilt on a capital offense,48 a unanimous vote on the
existence of an aggravating factor,49 a unanimous vote that
extenuating and mitigating circumstances are substantially
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, 50 and a
unanimous vote that death is the appropriate sentence.51 The
basic framework is the same as that found in civilian
systems, so maybe members faced with resolving the
difficult issue placed before them will follow the same
patterns as civilian jurors.
However, the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) include
provisions not found in civilian systems that should prevent
the force of social conformity from coming into play at three
of the four voting junctures - all but the final vote on life or
death. One of most important of these rules deals with how
46 Sandys, supra note 26, at 1207. Sundby describes how the process of
converting death votes to life votes is very similar. Sundby, supra note 25,
at 140-44. The jury filmed for the project displays many of these
dynamics. Frontline project, supra note 3. Interestingly, the holdout is
arguing for a conviction where the law clearly requires a conviction (the
case is about jury nullification). The force of social conformity works
against him and he eventually joins the vote for acquittal - not because he
believed the defendant was not guilty, but because he did not want to
prevent the others from reaching their decision.
47 After reviewing CJP data, Sundby concluded that capital juries followed
remarkably similar patterns as they reached a decision on the sentence.
Sundby, supra note 25, at 105-06. Juries would follow a five-step process:
first, the majority would unite with a strong viewpoint; second, the majority
would isolate and focus on the holdouts to get them to change their votes;
third, the majority would convert the holdouts to the majority position;
fourth, the majority would reconcile with and support the former holdouts
until the verdict was announced; and fifth, the jurors would wait in suspense
as the jurors were individually polled during the announcement of the
sentence, wondering if a holdout would change positions at the last minute.
Id. at 105-06, 146-48.
48 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(a)(2).
4 9 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(B).
'o Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C).
s" Id. R.C.M. 1006(d)(4)(A).
the panel votes and re-votes on the question of guilt as to the
capital offense. For death to be an available punishment in
the presentencing proceeding, a panel of at least twelve
members must vote unanimously that the accused is guilty of
the capital offense.52 After the members deliberate on the
capital offense, the members vote by secret written ballot. 53
The junior member collects and counts the ballots, the
president announces the result, and that result is the
finding.54
If the vote on the capital offense is two-thirds or greater
for guilt,5 5 the finding on that offense is guilty; however, if
the vote on the capital offense is not unanimous, then the
accused cannot face the death penalty. He is still guilty of
the offense, he is just not eligible for the death penalty.
Importantly, the rules prohibit the panel from re-voting on
that finding of guilt for the purpose of increasing the votes to
a unanimous vote, thereby making the accused death-
eligible. The finding can only be reconsidered under the
procedure outlined in Article 52 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and RCM 924,56 and those rules do
not allow for a non-unanimous vote for guilt to be
reconsidered.
This means an 11-1 vote for guilt is a finding and
cannot be revisited in an effort to get a unanimous vote on a
capital offense. The rules themselves preserve the minority:
the majority never gets a chance to apply pressure on the
minority members to change their votes to guilty. A single
panel member can anonymously remove the death penalty as
an available sentence by voting for a lesser-included offense
of the capital offense without subsequently having to explain
himself to the group.
Turning to the capital presentencing proceeding, some
of the rules also protect the minority. There are three
potential votes in the capital sentencing deliberations: a vote
on whether an aggravating factor exists;5 8 if all panel
members agree that at least one does, then a vote on whether
the extenuating and mitigating factors are substantially
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances (the balancing
test); 59 if all panel members vote yes, then they vote on the
ultimate sentence, which could include death.6 0 As with the
52 Id. R.C.M. 1004(a)(2).
"Id. R.C.M. 921I(c)(1).
54 Id. R.C.M. 921(c)(6).
s UCMJ art. 52(a)(2) (2008).
56 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 924(b) & discussion.
5 UCMJ art. 52(c); MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 924(b); R.C.M. 922(b)(2);
R.C.M. 922 analysis, at A21-70.
58 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(b)(7).
" Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C).
6o Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(7).
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merits voting, the votes are also by secret, written ballot,6 1
and the junior member collects and counts the ballots while
the president announces the result.62
For the first two votes (the vote on the aggravating
factor and the vote on the balancing test) the first vote is the
finding,63 just like the vote on guilt after the merits
deliberations is a finding. The votes on these first two gates
may not be reconsidered because there are no
reconsideration procedures for these votes.64 Like the vote
on guilt for the capital offense, if a single member
anonymously votes that no aggravating factor exists or that
the extenuating and mitigating factors are not substantially
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, then the
deliberations on those gates are over and those votes cannot
be revisited.
For these three findings votes (the guilt finding on the
capital offense, the aggravating factors finding, and the
balancing test finding), defense counsel should be wary of
"straw votes." Straw votes are informal votes taken by
members to see where they stand on the issues. They are not
authorized by the RCMs or the UCMJ but are not
specifically prohibited by these sources.6 5  However, the
Court of Military Review has said that "we do not believe
that this practice merits encouragement," 66 primarily because
straw polls circumvent the voting reconsideration rules,
remove anonymity, and allow superiority of rank
considerations to enter the deliberation room. 67 Having seen
that the established voting rules prevent the force of social
conformity from affecting these first three findings votes,
defense counsel should recognize the danger posed by straw
votes, should object to any request that straw votes be
allowed, should ask the military judge to instruct that no
straw votes may be taken, and should educate panel
members during voir dire to prevent straw votes.
" Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(7), 1006(d)(2). The rules expressly call for a secret,
written vote on the aggravating factors gate but do not expressly call for a
secret, written vote on the balancing gate. However, the CAAF advises
military judges to require that this vote be reduced to writing. United States
v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 159 (C.A.A.F. 1996). Complying with that advisory,
Army judges provide an instruction that calls for a secret, written vote on
the balancing decision. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY
JUDGES' BENCHBOOK para. 8-3-40 (1 Jan. 2010) [hereinafter MILITARY
JUDGES' BENCHBOOK].
62 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(d)(3).
6 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4).
64 Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C) & (b)(7); R.C.M. 1006.
6s United States v. Lawson, 16 M.J. 38, 41 (C.M.A. 1983).
66 Id.
67 Id. In Lawson, the panel asked the military judge whether they could
conduct straw votes on the findings (not on the sentence, where the rules
allow for revoting without using reconsideration rules), and the military
judge said they could. Id. at 40. Importantly, the defense counsel did not
object. Id. The Court of Military Review indicated that this procedure
would not be allowed over defense objection. Id. at 41.
Turning to the final vote on the sentence, the rules no
longer protect the minority to the same degree. Members
propose sentences in writing and submit them to the junior
member who in turn provides them to the president who
announces them in the deliberation room.6 8 The members
then vote and revote on the sentences, starting with the least
severe sentence, and continuing with the next least severe
until enough votes exist for a sentence.69 The vote
requirements are a three-fourths majority for lifeo (which is
the mandatory minimum for premeditated murder and felony
murder), 7 three-fourths for life without parole (LWOP), 72
and unanimous for death.
The panel continues to vote and revote until one of two
things happens. If enough panel members have voted for a
particular sentence, then the sentence has been adopted.74
(Unlike the merits vote and the first two votes during the
sentencing deliberations, this decision is not a "finding.")
Or, the panel can hang. In the court-martial system, panels
cannot hang on the merits-if there are not enough votes for
a guilty finding when the ballot count is announced, then the
accused is acquitted. However, panels can hang on the
sentencing decision.7 5  If the panel cannot agree on a
sentence, the military judge will declare a mistrial on the
sentence only (the merits findings still stand), and the case is
returned to the convening authority to either order a
rehearing on the sentence only or order that no punishment
be imposed.76
Unlike the first three votes, where the rules prohibit re-
voting and so shield against the force of social conformity,
here the rules allow that force to enter the deliberation room
because re-voting is explicitly allowed. One should expect
the force of social conformity to play a major role in
deliberations-the majority will get the chance to work on
the minority as the panel struggles to reach either a three-
fourths vote for life or LWOP, or a unanimous vote for
death. Even though the votes are still by secret, written
ballot,7 7 everyone will be able to recognize who the holdout
6 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(c).
69 Id., R.C.M. 1006(d)(3)(A). In a note to the hung jury instruction, the
Military Judges' Benchbook states that, "In capital cases, only one vote on
the death penalty may be taken." MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra
note 61, para. 2-7-18. However, that note is not supported by the rules or
case law.
76 UCMJ art. 52(b)(2) (2008).
" Id. art. 118(4).
72 Id. art. 52(b)(2).
7 Id. art. 52(b)(1).
74 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(d)(6).
7 Id. R.C.M. 1006(e); MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 61,
para. 2-7-18.
76 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1006(e).
" Id. R.C.M. 1006(d)(2).
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is because he is the one making the arguments for life.78
Further, the president of the panel can keep the deliberations
open until he or she feels that the debate is done,79 which
could mean keeping the deliberations open until the holdout
comes around.
While the primary rules for voting on a sentence allow
the force of social conformity to enter the deliberation room,
two ancillary rules could be used to counter that force. The
first rule is the hung jury instruction from the U.S. Army's
Military Judges' Benchbook, which explains to the panel
members that they do not have to agree:
[Y]ou each have the right to
conscientiously disagree. It is not
mandatory that the required fraction of
members agree on a sentence and therefore
you must not sacrifice conscientious
opinions for the sake of agreeing upon a
sentence. Accordingly, opinions may
properly be changed by full and free
discussion during your deliberations. You
should pay proper respect to each other's
opinions, and with an open mind you
should conscientiously compare your
views with the views of others.
[Y]ou are not to yield your judgment
simply because you may be outnumbered
or outweighed.
If, after comparing views and repeated
voting for a reasonable period in
accordance with these instructions, your
differences are found to be irreconcilable,
you should open the court and the
president may then announce, in lieu of a
formal sentence, that the required fraction
of members are unable to agree upon a
80
sentence.
This language explains to the holdout in a public setting that
he does not have to move from a conscientious decision (that
is, a moral decision based on an inner sense of right and
wrong) simply because he is outnumbered. His only
obligation is to deliberate for a reasonable period of time.
The problem for the defense counsel is getting the
military judge to read this instruction to the panel. The
78 In Lawson, the court recognized that, "Typically there will be some
discussion among court members as to the facts of a case, and it is hard to
imagine how, in speaking about the facts, a member could completely
conceal his views." United States v. Lawson, 16 M.J. 38, 40 (C.M.A.
1983).
7 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 502(b)(1), 1006; United States v. Accordino,
20 M.J. 102, 105 (C.M.A. 1985).
go MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 61, para. 2-7-18.
directions in the instruction state that it should be read
"[w]henever any question arises concerning whether the
required concurrence of members on a sentence or other
matter relating to sentence is mandatory" 8' or if the panel
"has been deliberating for an inordinate length of time." 82 if,
after deliberating, the panel asks the military judge a
question about the effect of a non-unanimous vote on the
death penalty, or if the panel has been deliberating for a long
time, the defense counsel should ask the military judge to
read this instruction. And, the defense counsel should work
this instruction into her voir dire of the panel.
If the panel adopts a sentence, another rule exists which
could work to counter the force of social conformity-the
reconsideration provisions for adopted sentences outlined in
RCM 1009.83 To reconsider an adopted sentence of death
with an eye toward lowering the sentence to life, only one
member needs to vote to reconsider.84 While this procedure
only applies to sentences that have been adopted (which
means that the holdout member has already given up, at least
temporarily) and not to the votes taken as the panel tries to
reach an adopted sentence, it does serve as a final
opportunity for a holdout member to return to his original
vote. The rules require that the panel go to the judge for
additional instructions before they can reconsider the
sentence.85  This provides the opportunity for the military
judge to read the hung jury instruction, which then might
work against the force of social conformity and enable the
holdout member to preserve his vote. After asking for
reconsideration, the panel member would be instructed that
the law does not expect him to change a firmly held moral
belief-he only needs to negotiate with an open mind for a
reasonable amount of time.
This discussion of the voting rules suggests that defense
counsel should focus on those decision points that have rules
that protect against the force of social conformity. Defense
counsel should refine their merits arguments to focus the
panel on lesser-included offenses. Defense counsel can use
"admission defenses"86 to present a credible argument that
81 Id.
82 Id.
8 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1009.
84 Id. R.C.M. 1009(e)(3)(B). To reconsider the sentence with a view toward
increasing the sentence from life to death requires a majority vote. Id.
R.C.M. 1009(e)(3)(A). That would require a significant number of life
voters to change to death voters and is unlikely to happen. See Sundby,
supra note 25, at 108-09.
85 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1009(e)(1).
86 Scott E. Sundby, The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the
Death Penalty, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1568-69, 1584 (1998).
Admission defenses "admit that the defendant committed the acts charged,
but also assert that she lacked the requisite intent to be held criminally liable
for the offense charged. Provocation, self-defense, insanity, diminished
capacity, and lack of specific intent are all examples of admission
defenses." Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983). See also
Carpenter, An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military Justice
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the accused is not guilty of the greater capital offense. In
their sentencing arguments, defense counsel should
specifically address the aggravating factors and the
balancing test. Defense counsel will often have to find novel
approaches to the aggravating factors since the aggravating
factors are often not in controversy, especially when there
are two or more murder victims.87 However, the balancing
test vote (that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances
are substantially outweighed by any aggravating
circumstances)88 is always in controversy. If the defense
counsel properly educates the members in voir dire and the
military judge clearly instructs the members on the voting
rules for the balancing test vote, a potential holdout juror
will recognize that he can anonymously end the debate on
life versus death by voting against death at the balancing test
vote.
Turning now to bullies in the deliberation room, we
should not expect to find overt bullies in a court-martial
deliberation room, but a dynamic that resembles that
pressure exists: the dynamic of rank in the deliberation
room. Overt use of rank within the deliberation room is a
form of unlawful command influence and is impermissible.
Panel members understand that. Senior-ranking members do
not look at the junior-ranking members and tell them, "You
will vote this way." The real problem is subtle or even
unintended influence. During deliberations, members will
learn where other members stand on the issues; therefore,
even though the voting is secret, the junior member will
generally know where the senior member stands and vice
versa. The Court of Military Review said as much in United
States v. Lawson:90
[W]e cannot deny that considerations of
rank may have, at least, an unconscious
effect upon the deliberations of a court-
martial. Typically there will be some
discussion among court members as to the
facts of the case, and it is hard to imagine
how, in speaking about the facts, a
member could completely conceal his
views.
Obviously, if [verbal "straw polls" were
taken], the danger would be enhanced,
because each member's position-albeit, a
tentative position-is clearly revealed to
Practitioners: Aggravation, Mitigation, and Admission Defenses, ARMY LAW.
(forthcoming July 2011).
87 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)(J).
" Id. R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(C).
89 United States v. Accordino, 20 M.J. 102, 104 (C.M.A. 1985).
90 16 M.J. 38 (C.M.A. 1983).
the others; and junior members might be
influenced to conform to the expressed
positions of their seniors.91
If the panel follows the correct voting procedures and does
not cast any straw votes, this dynamic should not be much of
an issue during the first three votes. The junior member can
anonymously cast a vote and end the discussion.
However, this dynamic may play a significant role in
the final vote for life or death. While one should not expect
that anyone on a panel will resort to name-calling or other
bully tactics, the respect given to rank might achieve the
same result. A junior panel member who is holding out for
life may change his vote when eleven other senior members
in the military, including a president who is most likely a
colonel, are telling him, albeit politely or through stares, that
a life vote is inappropriate. And, the president of the panel
can exercise his discretion to keep the deliberations open
until he feels that the debate is done,9 2 which a president
could do until he feels that the holdout vote has come
around.
A look at the RCMs, then, shows that the potential for
the force of social conformity exists in a military panel's
deliberation room. On the final vote for life or death, the
panel must continue to re-vote until they reach a sentence or
hang. One of the dynamics that causes a minority voter to
change his vote in a civilian jury-a bully in the deliberation
room-probably does not exist in that form in a military
panel room but may have a close counterpart: the influence
of rank in the deliberation room. The next step is to see if
any evidence exists that these dynamics have surfaced in a
capital court-martial.
Evidence of These Dynamics in Capital Courts-Martial
At least three capital courts-martial appear to reflect
some of the CJP findings. A review of the appellate
opinions of the modem capital courts-martial that have
resulted in approved death sentences93 reveals two cases in
which, at some point in deliberations, at least one panel
member voted for life. In addition, news reports of a recent
capital court-martial indicate that at least one panel member
voted for life before changing his or her vote to death. Two
of these cases may have also been impacted by the influence
of rank in the deliberation room.
One of the important CJP findings is that most juries
start deliberations with at least some jurors who support a
9' Id. at 40-41.
92 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 502(b)(1); R.C.M. 1006; Accordino, 20 M.J.
at 105.
9 See Colonel Dwight H. Sullivan, Killing Time: Two Decades of Military
Capital Litigation, 189 MIL. L. REv. 1, 17-19 (2006).
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life sentence.94 As discussed earlier, though, if the minority
vote is 25% or fewer, those jurors will almost always change
their minds.95 In United States v. Loving, possibly the
most recognized capital case in the military, the initial vote
on a proposed sentence was seven votes for death and one
for life.97  The panel re-voted the sentence after further
deliberations and, as the CJP findings would predict, that
one voter (12%) changed his vote to death.
The influence of rank in the panel room may have also
played a role in Loving. The Loving opinion contains three
affidavits from panel members,98 allowing a rare (though
short) glimpse into the deliberation room of a capital court-
martial. Again, the initial vote on the sentence in Loving
was seven votes for death and one for life.99 In this case,
under the president's guidance, the panel did not vote on
aggravating factors; 00 did not vote on the balancing gate;1ot
did not nominate sentences (the president, a colonel, told
them that they needed to vote between two options, life and
death);102 the junior member did not count the votes, but
passed them to the president to count instead;' 03 and the
panel did not vote on the lightest sentence first.10
After discussing that these rules exist to prevent rank
from entering the deliberation room, in the dissenting
opinion, Judge Wiss stated:
Regrettably, the specter [of unlawful
command influence] has been raised that
this carefully designed structure of
procedures broke down in this case-and
critically, that it did so entirely because the
superior-ranking member of the court
unilaterally imposed his own short-cut
94 William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing:
Juror's Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1491-96 (1998); Sandys, supra note 26.
9 Blume et al., supra note 10, at 173.
96 41 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
9 Id. at 234-35. Prior to the passage of Article 52a, UCMJ, in 2001, which
requires twelve members in a capital court martial, capital courts-martial
only require the same number of panel members that are required in any
general court-martial-five. UCMJ arts. 16(a)(A), 52a (2008).
98 The dissenting opinion in Loving contains all three affidavits in their
entirety. Loving, 41 M.J. at 331-33 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 234-35.
'" Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
'0 Id. at 233-35.
102 Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting). In theory, a case could be capital-
eligible going into the sentencing deliberations but then no panel member
would nominate death as a sentence. All of the panel members might
nominate life or life without parole (LWOP). In that case, the panel would
not be able to deliberate on death.
103 Id.
'"Id. at 313-14 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
toward a sentence rather than follow the
clear path carefully mapped out [by the
rules].'os
Judge Wiss concluded:
It is not within [the president's] authority
or discretion . . . to divine his own
personally preferred procedural path
toward a death sentence,.
Unlawful command influence? I think so.
. . . [These affidavits] portray a scenario in
which the senior-ranking member, solely
by the virtue of his rank, successfully
imposed a procedure that was unlawful. 0 6
In the context of the earlier discussion on juror
dynamics, the panel president's explanation of what
happened takes on new meaning. Here is what he said:
The judge had explained before we
adjourned that the death penalty required a
unanimous vote. . . After another 1 1/2
hours of review, I asked if everyone was
prepared to vote again. They said they
were. . . . The second vote resulted in the
following: 8 votes [for death]. 0 7
The language the president used is important, particularly
when viewed from the perspective of whoever was Panel
Member #8 in this case. Panel Member #8 knows that he
voted for life and is the only life vote, so the president of the
panel-the colonel who just made that statement-
necessarily voted for death. The colonel has just said that in
order to impose the death penalty, everybody needs to vote
for death. He did not say, "Or three-fourths of us can vote
for life, or we can be a hung jury, all three of which are
acceptable options." The implied message to the holdout is,
1os Id. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
'6 Id. at 314 (Wiss, J., dissenting). Judge Wiss contrasts the president's
ability and power to modify the procedures with the inability of a second
lieutenant on a panel to do the same thing. Id. at 314-15 n.1 (Wiss, J.,
dissenting):
Can it be more than rhetorical to ask whether anyone
except the most senior ranking person on the court
could have unilaterally imposed on all of the other,
presumably intelligent, officer members a procedure
of his own handiwork that was in marked deviation
from that which clearly and in detail was prescribed
by the military judge? I am not so naive as to believe
that a second lieutenant . . . could have been so
possessed of nature leadership that he so effectively
could have led astray a whole panel of his colleagues.
107 Id. at 331-33 (Wiss, J., dissenting). His account was confirmed by two
junior members on the panel who also provided affidavits. Id. Sundby
documents very similar language which was used against a holdout.
SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 90.
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"You need to change your vote." Panel Member #8 is the
one during deliberations who mentioned that life might be
appropriate, so everyone on that panel, including Panel
Member #8, must have know, that the colonel was speaking
to Panel Member #8.
In Loving, Panel Member #8 changed his vote-
possibly because of the social conformity dynamic and
because of the subtle pressure of rank in the deliberation
room.108 Even if the panel member genuinely changed his
mind (and not just his vote) based on the deliberations, the
key is to recognize that there is real potential for these
dynamics to exist.
The capital case of United States v. Thomas (Thomas
1)1o9 also contains portions of post-trial depositions given by
panel members. These depositions indicate that multiple
votes were taken on the finding of guilt with at least some
votes for acquittal on the capital offense."o This was
contrary to the RCMs, which, as discussed above, do not
allow for re-voting on the findings for the purpose of
seeking a unanimous vote on the capital offense. After
receiving instructions on the findings from the military
judge, the panel president asked how many times the panel
could vote on the verdict before they announced their
finding."' The military judge essentially told him that if
that issue came up, to come back to the military judge.1 12
Based on that question, the defense counsel asked the
military judge to ask the panel how many times they voted
on the finding but the military judge denied that request." 3
After the trial, the appellate defense counsel called the
junior member of the panel who told him (and another
appellate defense counsel) that the panel voted multiple
times on the finding of guilt.114 The appellate defense
counsel provided affidavits to the Navy-Marine Court of
Military Review, which then ordered depositions of the
panel members."15 Of these nine panel members, three said
that the initial vote on guilt included votes for not guilty with
probably two panel members voting for not guilty. Five said
108 The court in Loving resolved the unlawful command influence issue by
ruling that the affidavits provided by the panel members were not
admissible under the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EvID. 606(b) (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 MCM]. Loving, 41 M.J. at 239. The majority declined to
hold that the information included in the affidavits rose to the level of
unlawful command influence necessary to satisfy one of the exceptions in
Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 606(b). 1984 MCM, supra, MIL R. EVID.
606(b); Loving, 41 M.J. at 237-38.
'" 39 M.J. 626 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
n0 Id. at 637.
1" Id. at 628.
13id.
114 id.
"' Id. at 629.
that only one vote was taken on the guilty finding (including
the president, and, interestingly, the junior panel member
that the appellate defense counsel had interviewed earlier).
One had retired and refused to answer questions." 6
The difference in the way the panel members remember
the voting process is interesting. Very likely, the two panel
members who voted not guilty are among the three that
remember the multiple votes. They would have been the
ones that the group dynamics worked against and would
have felt a high degree of stress, resulting in a memorable
event. By this reasoning, the president of the panel was very
likely in the majority block that was voting for guilt. He
remembered only one vote.'"7  This president, like the
president in Loving, did not follow the rules and may have
unintentionally invited the subtle pressure of rank into the
deliberation room. Had the president followed the rules, no
further deliberations would have been allowed on the merits.
The accused would not have received a death sentence.
Instead, the minority voters changed their positions (at only
22%, this result conforms to the CJP findings), possibly
because of the force of social conformity and the subtle
pressure of rank in the deliberation room.
Last, in the recent capital court-martial of Master
Sergeant Timothy Hennis, the panel asked a question that
indicated that at least one panel member voted for life during
the sentencing deliberations.' After more than seven hours
of debate, the fourteen-member panel asked the military
judge, "If one person votes against imposing a death
sentence, are subsequent ballots automatically for a life
sentence?"ll 9 The reasonable inference from this is that at
least one person in the panel room voted for life, and to his
credit, the president of the panel returned to the judge for
guidance. The military judge told the panel to follow the
rules for voting on a sentence: to keep deliberating and
voting until the panel reached sufficient votes to adopt a
sentence (three-fourths for life or unanimous for death).120
The military judge did not, however, read them the hung
jury instruction. 121 After another six hours of deliberation,
consistent with the CJP findings (the minority was 7%), that
voter changed his vote and the panel adopted a sentence of
death.122  Had the military judge read the hung jury
instruction, the minority voter may have found assurances in
the language and hung on to his vote.
"' Id. at 628, 637.
"
7 Id. at 637.
"S Paul Woolverton, Hennis Jurors Extend Debate, FAYETrEVILLE
OBSERVER, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.fayobserver.com/Articles/2010/04/1
4991074.
"1 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Paul Woolverton, Hennis Sentenced to Death for 1985 Eastburn
Murders, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.fayobserv
er.com/Articles/2010/04/15/991361.
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These three cases indicate that panel members in capital
cases face similar dynamics when deliberating cases that
civilian jurors face. In each of these cases, at least one panel
member changed a vote that could have prevented the
imposition of the death penalty but changed that vote,
consistent with the research on jury dynamics. And in two
of these cases, the subtle influence of rank in the deliberation
room may have substituted for the bullying behavior that is
sometimes found in civilian juries.
Juror Confusion
Another of the major findings of the CJP is the striking
degree to which jurors do not understand the law because the
instructions were incomplete, poorly drafted, or otherwise
confusing. For example, even after hearing the instructions
and sitting through a capital trial, 63% of jurors in one study
thought that the law required them to impose the death
sentence if they found that the crime was heinous, atrocious,
or cruel;123 43% thought the same if they found the
defendant would pose a future danger;124 41% thought the
standard of proof on mitigating factors was beyond a
reasonable doubt;125 42% thought unanimity was required on
mitigating factors;126 only one-third understood that life was
the required sentence if the mitigating factors outweighed
the aggravating factors;I 27 and when given six basic
questions about the process to answer, Ifewer than 50% were
able to answer more than half of the questions correctly.128
One of the main reasons for this is that instructions are
written by trial lawyers for appellate lawyers and not for
jurors. Even when provided with the written instructions,
jurors find them long, boring, and confusing, "like the
undecipherable user's manual that comes with a new
computer, written by one technician for another." 29 The
instructions may have gaps or confusing portions and the
process for seeking clarification from the judge is
overwhelming, intimidating, and time consuming. If a juror
has a question, the court has to get the lawyers, get the
defendant from a holding cell, and formally march everyone
into the courtroom.' 30 The response from the judge is often
123 James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing
Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1174 (1995). See
also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1993); Stephen P.
Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries
in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. RIv. 627 (2000).
124 Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 123, at 1174.
' Id. at 1167.
126 Id.
12 7 Id. at 1173.
128 Id. at 1168.
129 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 49. See also Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note
123, at 1169.
13o SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 49-50.
to simply re-read the same instruction that the jurors found
was confusing.13 ' After doing that once, jurors figure out
that the process is not worth it and try to solve the problems
on their own--often incorrectly.' 32
For those who think that a military panel -filled. with
college-educated professionals will have no problem
following the instructions or the law, or that military judges
will provide complete, accurate instructions, a review of
three military capital cases may challenge that assumption.
Look again at Loving.133 The panel failed to follow many of
the military judge's instructions. According to affidavits
provided by three panel members, including the president (a
colonel), the panel did not vote on the aggravating factors,' 34
violating RCM 1004(b)(7).135  The panel did not vote on
whether the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the
extenuating and mitigating factors,'36  violating RCM
1004(b)(4)(B).'37 The panel did not vote in order of least
severe sentence to most severe sentence, 38 violating RCM
1006(d)(3)(A).' 39  The junior member did not count the
votes (the president did),140 violating RCM 1006(d)(3)(B).141
While this could be the result of the president deliberately
ignoring the rules, the panel may have just been confused.
The military judge also gave incomplete instructions.
He did not instruct that only one vote could be taken on say
again which gates and that those votes could not be
revisited.142 While at least one of the aggravating factors
(multiple murders)143 was not an issue, the holdout panel
member might have voted against the balancing gate had a
vote actually been taken specifically on that gate. If the
panel had been thoroughly instructed on the rules, and if the
panel had followed those rules, the minority voter may well
have voted against death at the balancing gate.
Similarly, in United States v. Thomas (Thomas 1),144
both the panel members and the military judge appeared
confused about the rules. After the military judge read the
instructions at the conclusion of the merits, the president of
131 Garvey et al., supra note 123.
132 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 50.
133 41 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
134 Id. at 234.
" 1984 MCM, supra note 108, R.C.M. 1004(b)(7).
36 Loving, 41 M.J. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
37 1984 MCM, supra note 108, R.C.M. 1004(b)(4)(B).
13s Loving, 41 M.J. at 234-35.
139 1984 MCM, supra note 108, R.C.M. 1006(d)(3)(A).
140 Loving, 41 M.J. at 313 (Wiss, J., dissenting).
141 1984 MCM, supra note 108, R.C.M. 1006(d)(3)(B).
142 Loving, 41 M.J. at 233.
143 Id. at 267.
'" 39 M.J. 626, 628 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
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the panel asked: "I want to say, your instructions on
reconsideration, if I understood correctly, we can have
several ballots on the issue? We can reconsider at anytime
up until the findings has been announced; and then,
additionally, before the sentence has been announced?"l 45
The correct response from the military judge should have
been:
Do not worry about sentencing right now.
Once you have finished deliberating, you
will vote by secret, written ballot. The
junior member will collect and count those
votes. You will then check that count and
announce the results.
If the president informs the panel that the
finding is not guilty, then if a majority of
you would like to reconsider the finding to
seek a guilty verdict, let me know and I
will give you further instructions.
If the president informs the panel that the
finding is guilty, then if more than one-
third of you would like to reconsider to
seek a not guilty verdict, then let me know
and I will give you further instructions.
However, if the president informs the
panel that the finding on the capital
offense is guilty, but one of you has voted
for not guilty on the capital offense, you
may not reconsider that vote for the
purpose of seeking a unanimous vote in
order to authorize a capital sentencing
rehearing. You may only reconsider that
vote to seek a not-guilty finding.
Compare that to the military judge's actual response: "If it
comes up-if anybody wants to raise the issue that, 'Hey, I
want to talk about this, reconsider it,' let me know and I'll
give you the instructions on it."l 46  Provided with this
incomplete response, the panel then re-voted the finding of
guilt on the capital offense in order to raise a seven-two vote
to a unanimous vote, which ultimately led to an adopted
sentence of death.
In both Loving and Thomas I, the military judges
provided incomplete but not incorrect instructions on the
specified issues. In United States v. Simoy,147 the military
judge issued a patently incorrect instruction: he told the
panel to vote on death before voting on life.148 The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) reversed, stating:
The instructions to the members should
make [clear that] . . . they may not vote on
the death penalty first if there is a proposal
by any member for a lesser punishment,
i.e., life in prison. Some of those members
who voted for the death penalty in this
case might have agreed with life in prison.
Thus, unless they held out on their vote for
the lesser punishment of life, three-fourths
might very well have agreed on life in
prison rather than death. Thus, it was
important for the members to understand
that, because of requirements for
unanimous votes, any one member at any
stage of the proceeding could have
prevented the death penalty from being
imposed.149
The court's reasoning is in concert with the CJP's findings:
a properly educated and instructed panel member might
decide to hold on to his or her vote for life.so In United
States v. Thomas (Thomas II),15 the CAAF dealt with an
error in the military judge's instructions that had not been
raised in Thomas I and found that the military judge's
instructions that the panel should vote on death first was
reversible error.152 One should not be surprised that panel
members are confused by the rules when these rules confuse
military judges, too.
Juror confusion also has the effect of causing a hung
jury. One of the primary concerns of jurors is to avoid
1' Id. at 613-14.
149 United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1, 2-3 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The statement,
"any one member at any stage of the proceeding could have prevented the
death penalty from being imposed" should be read to mean that at the first
three gates, one vote can prevent death from being considered as a sentence,
and on the sentencing vote, one vote can prevent death from ultimately
being imposed by hanging the jury.
Iso Note this interesting contrast between Loving and Thomas. If the panel
members vote improperly (they vote out of order or do not vote on certain
gates at all) because they are either confused or purposefully choose not to
follow the rules, but they do so after having been properly instructed by the
military judge, then the appellate courts will not intervene. The appellate
courts will let those known, faulty votes stand by finding that the evidence
of that improper voting does not satisfy MRE 606b. MCM, supra note 2,
MIL. R. EVID. 606(b). The courts will not consider the evidence, or
essentially, "hear no evil, see no evil." See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J.
213, 237-38 (C.A.A.F. 1994); Thomas, 39 M.J. at 636. If, however, the
military judge issues an incorrect instruction, and even without evidence
that the panel did in fact vote improperly, the courts will find those verdicts
untrustworthy. Simoy, 50 M.J. at 2-3; United States v. Thomas (Thomas
II), 46 M.J. 311, 312 (C.A.A.F. 1997). That seems to be a paradox within
due process but one sanctioned by the Supreme Court. See Tanner v.
United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
"' 46 M.J. 311.
152 Id. at 315-16.
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"s Id. at 628.
' Id.
146 M.J. 592 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
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becoming a hung jury.'5 3  In his case study, Sundby
describes what happened when the holdout juror suggested
that the jury deadlock on the sentencing decision.154 One of
the jurors read the instructions and thought that if the jurors
deadlocked, then the defendant would automatically get
LWOP.15 5 The instruction actually said that all that would
happen is that a new jury would reconsider the sentence.
After incorrectly decoding the instructions, the rest of the
jurors became increasingly upset with the idea that this one
juror "would now dictate the result." 56 This holdout juror
eventually changed his vote.
Something similar happened in Thomas I. Asked why
the panel took multiple votes during the guilt deliberations, a
panel member "said that they voted more than once to avoid
being a 'hung jury.' He had understood that a hung jury was
'a jury that has not reached a unanimous conclusion."" 5 7
The military judge did not instruct the members that they
were not required to come to a unanimous conclusion and
that they could not reconsider a non-unanimous finding of
guilt. 5  Had the panel members returned to the instructions
to find the answer, they would not have found it. Instead,
they would have found that standard instructions are
themselves confusing enough that sometimes military judges
cannot get them right.'5 9 The panel continued to deliberate
and re-vote, eventually convicting the accused of a capital
offense by a unanimous vote.
In addition to confusion about the rules themselves,
another area of significant confusion is the meaning of a life
sentence and the meaning of a death sentence. Jurors
generally do not believe that a life sentence, either with or
without parole, means that the defendant will actually spend
his life in prison.' 60 Rather, jurors tend to believe that if the
defendant does not get the death penalty, he will be back on
the street in fifteen years-even in jurisdictions that have
LWOP.16 1
"' Sundby, supra note 25, at 117-19. See generally Sandys, supra note 26,
at 1195-96, 1199, 1203, 1205-08.
154 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 90.
55 d.
5 Id. at 91.
sv Thomas1, 39 M.J. 626, 638 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993).
58 Id. at 646 (Jones, S.J., dissenting).
59 See United States v. Simoy, 50 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1998); Thomas II, 46
M.J. 311 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
'6 William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An
Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital
Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999); Benjamin D. Steiner, Folk
Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of
Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAW & SoC'Y
REV. 461 (1999); Theodore Eisenberg et al, Jury Responsibility in Capital
Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 339, 340 (1996)
[hereinafter, Eisenberg et al. Jury Responsibility]; Theodore Eisenberg et
al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 373
(2001) [hereinafter, Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox].
16! Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, 645-48.
Considering that future dangerousness is one of the
determining factors in a juror's decision to vote for death,162
this issue is no small matter. Jurors are more likely to vote
for death when they believe that the alternative to death will
result in the defendant's release from prison.' 63 Those who
underestimate the parole date are more likely to vote for
death, more so as the trial progresses:
[J]urors who underestimate the alternative
are more likely to vote for death, whether
the alternative does or does not permit
parole. In fact, it is when jurors think the
defendant will return to society in less than
twenty years, regardless of how much
longer he will actually serve, that they are
substantially more likely to vote for death.
165
If the panel members use their "folk knowledge" about when
murderers are paroled, then they may be making uninformed
or misinformed decisions about whether someone should
live or die.
Understandably, this is a critical issue to jurors. Sundby
notes that this is often the area when the jury deadlocks:
[J]urors favoring life would have
acknowledged that they would of course
vote for death if they thought the
defendant would ever get out of jail, and
the jurors favoring death would have
agreed that arguments existed for a life
sentence but maintained that a life
sentence could not guarantee the defendant
would not be back on the streets. 66
Jurors often ask the trial judge, "If we sentence the
defendant to life, will he ever be paroled?" The trial judge
usually says that "life means life" or simply rereads the
instructions.
This is the rule in the military. In United States v.
Simoy,16 7 the only options for the panel were life with parole
and death.168 As Sundby would predict, the panel asked the
military judge whether the accused could be paroled if
sentenced to life and the judge gave the "life means life"
162 Blume et al., supra note 10, at 165-67.
163 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, at 655.
'6Id.
165 Id. at 671. See also Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 123.
166 Sundby, supra note 25, at 117.
67 46 M.J. 592 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996).
168 Id. at 614. The offense occurred before 1997, which was the year that
Congress authorized life without parole as a punishment for premeditated
murder. UCMJ art. 56a(a) (2008).
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response, telling them that whether or not the accused could
be paroled was collateral to the sentencing decision and not
something that they should consider. 169 In the recent capital
court-martial of Master Sergeant Timothy Hennis, the panel
was faced with the same issue.170  The panel asked the
military judge if the accused could be paroled if given a life
sentence and the military judge replied with the "life means
life" instruction.' 7 '
However, jurors would likely take that response to mean
the judge is hiding the fact that the defendant can be
paroled.172  And when jurors remain confused about the
meaning of life, they revert to using their folk knowledge
about when murderers are released from prison. 17 The
result of this confusion is that jurors or panel members may
choose death not because it is the appropriate punishment
but because it is the least inappropriate of the alternatives
that they believe exist-particularly when LWOP is not an
option. Commentators call this a "forced choice":174
Some jurors who voted for death say that
the defendant did not deserve to die, but
deserved a true life sentence. They say
that they did not believe death was the
.appropriate punishment, that they wanted
LWOP, but that death was their only
option in view of what they knew about
parole. They say the defendant deserved
life; the jury wanted life; but that was not
an option. 75
They may even solve the problem by deciding that, because
of endless appeals and the rarity of executions, "death" does
not mean "death" - it means life spent on death row until the
defendant dies of a heart attack.17 6 If the jurors believe that
the defendant might one day be paroled if given a life or
LWOP sentence, 7 7 but will not be paroled if given a death
sentence and will not actually be executed, then jurors may
vote for death to punish the defendant with a form of super-
LWOP: 7 1
'
69 Id. 46.
170 The offense occurred before 1997. Woolverton, supra note 118.
'7' Id.
172 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, at 673-77.
17 Id.
174 Id. Bowers and Steiner argue that this "forced choice" may be
unconstitutional.
"' Id. at 677.
76 SUNDBY, supra note 15, at 38-39.
77 Jurors remain skeptical that life without parole actually means that the
defendant will never be paroled. Sundby, supra note 25, at 117.
'
7 1 d. at 39.
Some jurors who voted for death did so in
the belief that this was the way to come
closest to an LWOP sentence, that it was
the only way to keep the defendant in
prison for the rest of his life. They became
convinced that sentencing the defendant to
death would not really mean his execution,
but would ensure that he stays in prison for
life.179
The military has a long appellate process and a high rate of
overturning death sentences, and has not executed anyone
since 1961.so One can reasonably believe that some
military panel members believe death does not equal death
and so will follow this reasoning.
How a military counsel deals with this question will
depend on whether LWOP is available in that particular
case. Military defense counsel defending capital cases in
which LWOP is not an option should seek to fully inform
the panel about the parole process because the rules make it
very unlikely that this type of offender will ever be paroled.
For example, under Army regulations, an Army service
member convicted of murder can only be paroled if the
Secretary of the Army or his designee approves the parole
board's recommendation.' 82  Panel members who are
considering voting for life can be reasonably confident that
no Secretary of the Army is going to take the political risk of
signing the parole paperwork for someone who has
committed the kind of a crime that many people feel
warrants a death sentence.
For cases without LWOP as an option, fully informing
the panel should lead to more reliable sentences-the panel
members will only choose death if death is the appropriate
179 Bowers & Steiner, supra note 159, at 678.
18o Sullivan, supra note 93.
181 In the recent capital court-martial of Master Sergeant Timothy Hennis,
the husband and father of the three murder victims expressed that reasoning:
the death penalty will "'keep him there until that sentenced is carried out or
until he dies a natural death, which I think is a just punishment,' [the
widower] said, and it doesn't matter to him whether Hennis is executed."
Woolverton, supra note 122.
1 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 15-130, ARMY CLEMENCY AND PAROLE
BOARD para. 4-2b (23 Nov. 1998). While an Army service member
sentenced to life with parole cannot be paroled from a military prison
without approval of the Secretary of the Army or his designee, the service
member could be transferred to a federal prison where he would fall under
federal parole regulations rather than Army parole regulations. Id. para. 3-
le(9). If that happened, the Secretary of the Army would lose his veto
authority over any subsequent parole recommendation. However, the
decision to transfer an Army prisoner to a federal prison is wholly the
Army's to make. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 190-47, THE ARMY
CORRECTIONS SYSTEM para. 3-3 (15 June 2006). If the Secretary of the
Army wants to prevent someone who has committed a heinous crime but
who has been sentenced to life in prison with parole from ever leaving
prison, the Secretary of the Army can do that by preventing the service
member from being transferred to a federal prison and then vetoing any
recommendation for parole that comes before him.
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punishment, not the least inappropriate of the sentencing
alternatives. If defense counsel simply seek the "life means
life" instruction, the CJP findings suggests that the panel
will assume that the judge is hiding the fact that the accused
can be paroled and will then follow the reasoning outlined
above-that he will be paroled, and the best way to prevent
his parole is to put him on death row.
In the military, the degree of this "forced choice"
problem should be reduced for those cases with offenses
committed after the 1997 change to Article 50(a) that
authorized LWOP. The CJP findings indicate that many
jurors find LWOP to be an appropriate alternative to the
death penalty.'83 However, the problem still exists, even in
LWOP cases:
[E]ven when the law does in fact provide
for LWOP or LWOP+, jurors and
members of the general public are unaware
of it, or, if they are aware of it, they do not
believe it. Instead, they wrongly think the
alternative to death is some term of
imprisonment short of LWOP. Reality is
one thing; perception is another.1 84
To complicate this problem, in the military, LWOP does not
mean LWOP. The convening authority can reduce the
sentence at action, the President can pardon the
accused, 8 or after the accused serves 20 years in prison, the
Service Secretary can remit the sentence to life with
parole.' 87 If the panel asks the military judge whether an
accused can ever get out of confinement if given LWOP,
what should the military judge say? Here, fully informing
the panel might lead to an unreliable sentence: the panel
members might choose death not because it is the
appropriate sentence but because they believe it is less
inappropriate than an LWOP sentence where the accused
can technically be paroled. 88
All military attorneys in the court room-trial counsel,
defense counsel, and the military judge-should be
committed to ensuring that the panel understands the law
and the rules of the deliberative process. All should be
committed to reducing panel member confusion. The laws
and rules are designed to ensure a reliable sentence, the very
lynchpin of death penalty jurisprudence' 89 So far, in at least
83 Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox, supra note 159, at 391.
" Id. at 395-96.
1 UCMJ art. 56a(b)(1)(A) (2008).
s6 Id. art. 56a(b)(3).
187 MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. I108(b).
118 In the Military Judges' Benchbook, the only guidance is for the military
judge to say that LWOP means "confinement for life without eligibility for
parole." MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 61, para. 8-3-40.
189 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972).
three of the fourteen modern military capital convictions,
panels have not followed the rules or the military judge has
issued improper deliberation instructions. This problem can
be solved by drafting clear instructions and providing
helpful responses to panel member questions. The tougher
problem is whether to inform panel members- when that
information might actually lead to an unreliable sentence,
such as when the panel asks about the meaning of LWOP.
Juror Responsibility
An earlier discussion touched upon an issue related to
juror responsibility: the belief held by some jurors that if
they vote for death, the defendant will never be executed.
The reasoning is that if a juror believes that the defendant
will never be executed, then the juror will not really feel that
he is responsible for his decision because it will never be
carried
that:
out. The broader theory of juror responsibility is
[T]he decisions of people who feel
personally responsible for an outcome
differ from the decisions where the
individual assumes no such responsibility..
. . particularly when the decision involves
consequences to the welfare of another
person . . . Given that a life or death
decision during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial is as important a consequence
to another person as there can be, it
follows that the degree of responsibility
experienced by a jury would impact on
capital decisions.' 90
Theodore Eisenberg and colleagues further refine juror
responsibility into role responsibility and causal
responsibility.' 9' Role responsibility is "the obligations one
has flowing from a role one has assumed ... [I]n the capital
sentencing context, role responsibility focuses on whether
jurors understand and accept the primary responsibility they
have for the defendant's sentence in the role they have
assumed as sentencer." 92  A juror might believe that
someone other than himself has the primary role in making
the sentencing decision, or that he is carrying out the
decision on behalf of someone else. Jurors might shift
responsibility for their decision to any number of places, to
include the law, if, as discussed earlier, the jurors incorrectly
believe that the law requires a death sentence;'9 3 to the
judge;194 to the community;195 or to the other jurors, through
19 Sherman, supra note 28, at 1242.
9! Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 340.
192 id.
193 Sherman, supra note 28, at 1244.
'
9 id.
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de-individualization and group dynamics, as discussed
earlier.19 6 The CJP provides evidence that some jurors do
shift role responsibility.1 97  "Most jurors accept role
responsibility though a disquietingly large minority do
not."' 9 8 And the degree to which jurors feel responsible for
the sentencing decision appears to be modestly correlated to
the final vote: "[W]e find limited evidence that jurors who
impose life sentences accept more responsibility than do
jurors who impose death sentences."l 99
The other type of juror responsibility is causal
responsibility. Causal responsibility is "whether or not, and
how strongly, someone or something figures in the causal
chain leading to some outcome . . . [including] all of the
factors that might be responsible for the defendant's
sentence, including, most importantly, the conduct of the
defendant himself."200 If a juror (understandably) believes
that the defendant is primarily responsible for his own
sentence, that lessens the juror's feeling of personal
responsibility for the sentence-and the CJP findings
indicate that jurors do shift causal responsibility to the
defendant.201 Another significant factor in causal
responsibility is the belief held by some jurors that the
defendant will never be executed-the "death does not mean
death" belief.202 "A clear majority say that 'very few' death-
sentenced defendants will ever be executed, and about 70
percent of jurors believe that 'less than half or 'very few'
will be executed." 203
Of the ways that jurors can shift responsibility, some
may not apply to any degree in courts-martial. Toward role
responsibility, judges do not play a role in the military's
capital sentencing scheme. But some may apply as well to
courts-martial as they do to civilian trials. Panel members
may shift role responsibility to other jurors through group
dynamics or to the law by mistakenly believing that the law
sometimes requires the death penalty, and may shift causal
responsibility to the accused. Some may apply with even
greater force. Toward causal responsibility, one can
reasonably assume that a court-martial panel member will
have more confidence that the accused will not be executed
than a juror on a Texas jury.
* Id. at 1245.
116 Id. at 1246.
97 Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of
Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1138
(1995).
198 Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 349.
'99 Id. at 341, 376-77.
20 Id at 340-41. See also Sherman, supra note 28, at 1244.
201 Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 341.
2o
2 I d. at 340. See also Sherman, supra note 28, at 1245.
203 Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 363.
One type of role responsibility may have special
significance in the military: the shift of responsibility to the
community. Steven Sherman describes the shift to the
community in the civilian context as follows:
Jurors are informed that they have been
chosen as representatives of the
community, and that they must represent
the moral values of that community. In a
capital case, there is often outrage and
anger in the community-at-large about the
murder. Cries for retribution and a death
sentence are common. Believing that they
are simply conduits for the expression of
community values can greatly diminish the
jurors' personal sense of responsibility.2 04
In the military context, add to this the special role of the
convening authority in the administration of military justice,
both before and after the court-martial.
Capital cases are unique in that these are the only
courts-martial in which the convening authority, by the very
act of referral, has communicated to the panel what he thinks
is the appropriate sentence in that case. The panel members
can reasonably assume that the convening authority believes
that death is the appropriate sentence; otherwise, the
convening authority would not have referred the case with a
capital instruction. Military attorneys tend to analyze
problems like this using the framework for unlawful
command influence205 (and maybe this is a form of
unintended but per se unlawful command influence), but for
a capital defense counsel, this referral process presents
additional problems. If the panel member believes, or even
just thinks, that he is simply a conduit for the expression of
the convening authority's values, then he may shift role
responsibility for his decision to the convening authority.
Another problem exists: the panel members may shift role
responsibility to the convening authority in the way that
civilian jurors might shift responsibility to the judiciary.
Panel members who are aware that a convening authority
can reduce a sentence (and one should assume that panel
members know this) may opt for a higher sentence believing
that if they miss the convening authority's target, the
convening authority will reduce the sentence later.
This is not a fanciful problem. In United States v.
Dugan,206 the convening authority had held meetings where
he discussed military justice issues in an inappropriate way,
essentially saying that there was no room in the military for
204 Sherman, supra note 28, at 1245.
205 Convening authorities cannot tell panel members what the appropriate
punishment is for an accused. United States v. Baldwin, 54 M.J. 308, 310
(C.A.A.F. 2001).
2 58 M.J. 253 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
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drug users.207 The military judge allowed voir dire on this
issue but that remedy was not good enough-apparently, the
remaining panel members were still concerned about what
the convening authority would think of their sentence
because they talked about that in the deliberation room.
According to a letter filed by the junior member of the panel,
"a couple of the panel members expressed the notion that a
Bad Conduct Discharge was a 'given' for a person with
these charges" 208 and "a panel member reminded us that our
sentence would be reviewed by the convening authority and
we needed to make sure our sentence was sending a
consistent message." 209 This was a not a capital case but still
shows that panel members think-and even talk-about how
the convening authority will think about their sentence. This
process shifts role responsibility away from the panel
member and onto the convening authority.
To ensure panel members retain responsibility for their
decisions, in capital cases the defense counsel should ask the
judge to "instruct jurors that the decision they are about to
make is, despite its legal trappings, a moral one and that, in
the absence of legal error, their judgment will be final."210
Counsel should explore in voir dire what the panel members
think about the fact that the convening authority referred the
case with a capital instruction. And counsel should explore
with the panel members in voir dire whether they would
shift role responsibility for their individual decisions onto
the panel as a whole-as in, whether they would concede
their personal, conscientious decision to the majority
because of group pressure.
Colorado Voir Dire
The CJP has influenced one of the major revolutions in
capital trial work-the development of the Colorado voir
dire method. One of the CJP findings is that most juries
start deliberations with at least some jurors who support a
life sentence. 2 1  David Wymore recognized that the key for
defense counsel is to find a way to preserve those potential
212
votes. Essentially, he set out to find a way around the
force of social conformity that Asch documented.
207 Id. at 254.
208 Id. at 255.
209 Id. The court took the unintended unlawful command influence issue
seriously and returned the case for a fact finding hearing: "It is exactly this
type of command presence in the deliberation room-whether intended by
the command or not-that chills the members' independent judgment and
deprives an accused of his or her constitutional right to a fair and impartial
trial." Id. at 259.
210 Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility, supra note 159, at 379.
211 Bowers et al., at 1491-96; Sandys, supra note 26.
212 Videotape: Selecting a Colorado Jury-One Vote for Life (Wild Berry
Productions 2004), available at http://www.thelifepenalty.com/).
Asch described the subject's quandary in his experiment
as this, which, as it turns out, is much the same as the
quandary that many capital jurors believe they are in:
The subject knows (1) that the issue is one
of fact; (2) that a correct result is possible;
(3) that only one result is correct; (4) that
the others and he are oriented to and
reporting about the same objectively given
relations; (5) that the group is in
unanimous opposition at certain points
with him.213
However, if the juror knows that his decision is a moral,214
not necessarily factual, decision; that more than one
resolution of this complex problem is possible; that he must
decide for himself what the resolution should be;215 and that
it is acceptable to be in opposition to the majority, then the
force of social conformity might be significantly defused. If
Asch had told his subjects that more than one result was
possible and that the majority might have it wrong, the
results of his experiment would likely have been much
different.
David Wymore pioneered a new method of voir dire for
use in capital cases that, among other things, seeks to reduce
the force of social conformity and get the life votes out of
the deliberation room. Called the Colorado voir dire method
(Wymore was practicing in Colorado when he developed
this method), the method has two basic parts.216 The first
part is designed to get jurors to accurately express their
views on capital punishment and mitigation in order for the
defense to rationally exercise their peremptory challenges
and to build grounds for challenges for cause.217 The second
part is designed to address the Asch findings on group
dynamics. This part focuses on teaching the juror the rules
213 ASCH, supra note 16, at 461.
214 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
215 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
216 This is a very simplified description of the method. The method is
generally taught over a three or four day hands-on seminar. The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers generally offers one training
seminar on the Colorado method every year. See CLE & Events, NAT'L
Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/meetings (last
visited Oct. 7, 2010). One of these seminars has been captured on video
and is available for training. Videotape: Selecting a Colorado Jury-One
Vote for Life, supra note 211. See generally Richard S. Jaffe, Capital
Cases: Ten Principles for Individualized Voir Dire on the Death Penalty,
CHAMPION, Jan. 2001, at 35.
217 Under the Colorado method, defense counsel exercise their peremptory
challenges based only on the juror's death views. The method uses a
ranking system based on juror responses. This portion of the method (the
wise use of the peremptory challenge) plays a small role when Colorado
voir dire is used in a court-martial. In the federal system, the defense gets
twenty peremptory challenges in a capital case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
However, in the military, the accused in a capital case only gets one.
MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 912(f)(4). In the military, defense counsel
should focus on building grounds for challenge for cause.
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for deliberation; that he is making an individual moral
decision;218 that he needs to respect the decisions of others;
and that he is entitled to have his individual decision
respected by the group. The goal is not to teach the juror to
change everyone else's mind- the goal is to teach the
juror how not to fold and to teach the other jurors to respect
everyone else's opinions.
The method is grounded in constitutional law219 and fits
within the framework of the military's liberal grant mandate.
The liberal grant mandate is a response to the unique nature
of the military justice system, "because in courts-martial
peremptory challenges are much more limited than in most
civilian courts and because the manner of appointment of
court-martial members presents perils that are not
encountered elsewhere." 220 The reasoning is that since the
convening authority can hand-pick the panel members, in
fairness, the defense counsel should be able to conduct voir
dire of the panel members and then the military judge should
give the Defense the benefit of the doubt on challenges when
an issue arises.
Defense counsel should anticipate possible objections to
the use of this method of voir dire and litigate any issues that
might implicate panel dynamics, panel confusion, and panel
member responsibility to establish a foundation for using the
method. The defense counsel will probably not receive the
direct remedy requested in the motion but likely will receive
a different, valuable remedy: the ability to voir dire the
panel members on that issue. For example, the defense
counsel should file motions to have the junior member
appointed as the president; require random panel member
selection; find per se unlawful command influence in the
referral process; change the place of trial based on pretrial
publicity; trifurcate the trial into a merits, aggravating factor,
and sentencing phase to reduce panel member confusion; 221
allow an opening statement in the presenting proceeding
because of potential panel member confusion; request
certain instructions; request additional peremptory
challenges and limit government peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause; allow parole rules and statistics as
mitigation; etc.
For the military defense counsel who is detailed to a
capital case, training in the Colorado method is the most
important capital-specific training to receive.222 If the
218 See generally Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985).
219 See John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification" Through
Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1229 (2001).
220 United States v. James, 61 M.J. 132, 139 (C.A.A.F. 2005). See also
United States v. Downing, 56 M.J. 419, 422 (C.A.A.F. 2002); United States
v. Glenn, 25 M.J. 278, 279 (C.M.A. 1987).
221 Donald M. Houser, Note, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current
Structure of the Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation,
64 WASH & LEE L. REv. 349 (2007).
222 Prior to the passage of Article 52a in 2001, which requires twelve
members in a capital court martial, capital courts-martial only required the
counsel in Thomas I had known of and used the Colorado
method, the outcome at trial may well have been different.
Had the panel members been educated on the rules and then
followed them, they very likely would not have re-voted the
initial guilt finding and the case would not have reached the
presentencing proceeding with death as an authorized
punishment.223 Similarly, in Loving, the outcome at trial
may have been different had the holdout panel member been
educated on the rules. He may have voted against death at
the balancing gate.224
In these two cases, teaching the members techniques to
withstand group pressure may have helped to preserve the
holdout votes: in both cases, the minority voters fell in the
range where the minority block will fold (in Loving, one of
eight voters, or 12%; in Thomas I, two of nine voters, or
22%). Getting the president of the panel to commit to
following the rules may have helped to preserve the votes.
This would have prevented the possibility of the subtle
influence of rank in the panel room, as might have occurred
in Loving and Thomas I.
With proper instructions and thorough voir dire, the
defense counsel can address all of these dynamics-the
force of social conformity, the subtle pressure of rank in the
deliberation, juror confusion, voting rules, the parole
problem, and juror responsibility. Using the Colorado
method will not ensure a life sentence-some crimes may
warrant the death penalty from a qualified panel-but using
this method should help ensure a reliable sentence in which
every member votes his or her conscience rather than the
group's opinion.
Conclusion
Hopefully, this overview of the CJP has reduced the
space occupied by the capital Unknown Unknowns. In your
capital case, you should realize that your panel members will
behave in ways consistent with the CJP findings on juror
dynamics. You should realize that your panel members
might be confused about the law and the rules. You should
same number of panel members that are required in any general court-
martial-five. UCMJ arts. 16(a)(A), 52a (2008). Some cases that
originated before this change suggested to defense counsel that they should
not strike members from panels in order to raise the total number of panel
members from five to something much larger, which would therefore
increase the odds that one panel member might be seated who would
eventually vote for life. See United States v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592, 627 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (Morgan, J., concurring). Now that the minimum
number of panel members is twelve, that advice is inapplicable and should
not be followed. We also now know from the CJP findings that that advice
may have been to no avail anyway: even if the panel grew to a size where
one potential life vote were seated, if he were the only life vote, he would
change his vote anyway.
223 Thomas' death sentence was set aside. United States v. Thomas, 46 M.J.
311 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
224 Loving still faces the death penalty. United States v. Loving, 68 M.J. I
(C.A.A.F. 2009).
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realize that your panel members might shift responsibility to
other actors in the case. And you should realize that you
must learn the Colorado method of voir dire so that you can
address all of those dynamics.
Still, the CJP covers much more than jury dynamics,
juror confusion, and juror responsibility. Depending on your
case, it may offer additional insight into areas like race,
religion, the effect of the accused not testifying, jurors'
views on experts,225 victim impact testimony, and more. But
the CJP is not everything. The void of Unknown Unknowns
is great. Should defense counsel approach the victims and
survivors? 226 How do you present or rebut the case for
future dangerousness? What is impaired executive
functioning? I am sure that there are many more - I just do
not know what they are. They are, after all, Unknown
Unknowns.
Although this article has examined three capital courts-
martial in which the panels appeared to act and think
consistently with the CJP findings and three capital courts-
martial in which panel members and judges appeared
confused, some may still question whether the CJP findings
can apply to court-martial practice. The only way to truly
resolve that question is to conduct research on military
panels, capital and non-capital. One might quickly respond
that the rules do not allow anyone to talk to panel members,
thereby preventing research. But do the rules say that?
Almost all of the rules that one can point to deal with
whether evidence of what happened in the deliberation room
can be admitted in court.227 Those rules do not prohibit a
panel member from talking to a researcher. The apparent
prohibition comes from an unlikely source-the oath given
to panel members. The text of the oath is not mandated by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice; rather, Article 42(a)
simply states that the service secretaries shall prescribe the
form of oaths.228 The Secretary of the Army did so in Army
Regulation 27-10, directing that this oath be used: "[T]hat
you will not disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any
particular member of the court (upon a challenge or) upon
the findings or sentence unless required to do so in due
course of law." 229 The primary purpose behind the rules,
and presumably, this oath, is to protect freedom of
deliberation, protect the stability and finality of verdicts,
protect panel members from harassment and embarrassment,
and prevent unlawful command influence.230
Researchers could ask questions that prevent a panel
member from violating this oath (say, by not identifying any
particular member's vote or opinion) while still respecting
the values underlying the MREs and RCMs-and these rules
would then govern any statements made by a panel member
to a researcher if someone wanted to introduce them in the
particular court-martial of which one of these panel
members was a member. A well-crafted, properly-
conducted sociological research project could call into
question many of our assumptions about whether rank plays
a role in the deliberation room or whether panel members
follow instructions. Research could cause us to reexamine
the legal fictions that are found throughout the common law.
Research could shed light on how our panels approach
sexual assault cases. And, most importantly, properly
conducted research can help military attorneys fully
understand their audience so that they can present cases to
them in ways that will allow them to solve the difficult
problems they are given. Military justice can certainly
benefit from that.
225 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury As Critic: An Empirical Look at How
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109
(1997) (providing an interesting article on how to effectively use expert
witnesses, in capital cases or otherwise).
226 Richard Burr, Expanding the Horizons of Capital Defense: Why Defense
Teams Should be Concerned About Victims and Survivors, CHAMPION, Dec.
2006, at 12; Russell Stetler, Capital Cases: Working with the Victim's
Survivors in Death Penalty Cases, CHAMPION, June 1999, at 42.
227 See MCM, supra note 2, MIL. R. EvID. 509 & 606; R.C.M. 923
discussion; R.C.M. 1007(c).
228 UCMJ art. 42(a) (2008).
229 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE para. 11-8c (16
Nov. 2005) [hereinafter AR 27-10]. This is the same as the suggested oath
found in MCM, supra note 2, R.C.M. 807(b)(2) discussion. As a practical
matter, the oath given in all Army courts-martial is that found in the
MILITARY JUDGES' BENCHBOOK, supra note 612, para. 2-5, which is the
same as that in AR 27-10 and the RCM 807(b)(2) discussion except that the
parentheses were dropped. However, at the end of the members' service,
the trial judge is supposed to give this instruction: "If you are asked about
your service on this court-martial, I remind you of the oath you took.
Essentially, the oath prevents you from discussing your deliberations with
anyone, to include stating any member's opinion or vote, unless ordered to
do so by a court." Id. para. 2-5-25 (emphasis added). That is an incorrect
statement-the oath required by the MCM and Army regulations is much
narrower.
230 See United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 235-37 (C.A.A.F. 1994).
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